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Abstract 
This article shows that the UK has blended preventive and traditional UK criminal enforcement 
techniques to implement the UCPD; these techniques have been ‘Europeanised’ by the UCPD 
unfairness concepts; and the UCPD may also cause UK private law to be Europeanised in more 
‘spontaneous’ ways. However, there are limits to this Europeanising effect. First of all, the 
‘home grown’ financial services regime is likely to remain dominant, inter alia, because of the 
high standards of protection it sets and because of Article 3(9) of the UCPD, which exempts 
financial services from the full harmonisation principle. Secondly, judges may limit the extent of 
Europeanisation. The UCPD’s European concepts of fairness often have the potential to increase 
standards of protection relative to pre-existing UK law. However, these concepts are sufficiently 
open textured as to run the risk of being interpreted in non-protective ways, based on underlying 
UK judicial ethics of self-interest and self-reliance. So far, High Court judges have taken quite 
a protective approach to interpretation of the UCPD concepts. However, the full impact of the 
UCPD European fairness standards in the UK will only become clear when cases reach the 
appeal courts; and the ECJ more fully develops its approach.
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1 Introduction
This article considers the manner in which the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive1 
(UCPD) has been received in the UK. It shows that the UK has used a blend of 
preventive and traditional UK criminal enforcement techniques, while we argue that 
these techniques have been ‘Europeanised’ by the open-textured nature and breadth of 
application of the UCPD unfairness concepts. In addition, although the UCPD does not 
require member states to grant private law enforcement rights, we also argue that UK 
private law may nevertheless be Europeanised by the UCPD in more ‘spontaneous’ 
(less direct) ways, as a result of the planned introduction of private law remedies for at 
least certain violations of the (distinctly European) UCPD concepts of fairness.
 Nevertheless, our further contention is that there are limits to this Europeanising 
effect. First of all, in the important area of financial services, for example, the ‘home 
grown’ regime is likely to remain dominant, because it operates within a well-established 
institutional structure and may well set higher standards of protection than those in 
the UCPD. (This is permitted by Article 3 (9) of the UCPD, which exempts financial 
services and immovable property from the full harmonisation principle that applies 
generally under the UCPD.)
 Secondly, there is a possibility that judges may limit the extent of Europeanisation. In 
contrast to the particular position in relation to financial services, the UCPD’s European 
concepts of fairness often have the potential to increase standards of protection relative 
to pre-existing UK law. However, these European concepts are sufficiently open textured 
as to run the risk of being interpreted in non-protective ways, based on underlying UK 
judicial ethics of self-interest and self-reliance. So far, High Court judges have taken 
a relatively protective approach to interpretation of the UCPD concepts. However, we 
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will only really have a clear picture as to the impact of European fairness standards in 
the UK when we hear the views of the appeal courts; and hear more from the ECJ.
2 UK Implementation: Techniques and Europeanisation
2.1 UCPD Unfairness Concepts and Requirements
As is well known, the UCPD contains general clauses on ‘misleading practices’ (divided 
into ‘misleading actions’ and ‘misleading omissions’) and ‘aggressive practices’ 
(the main operative provisions in practice), as well as an overriding general clause, 
catching practices that are ‘contrary to the requirements of professional diligence’.2 It 
seems that this ‘professional diligence’ clause is intended to encapsulate, but possibly 
sometimes extend beyond, what would be caught by the general clauses on misleading 
practices and on aggressive practices.3 There is also a list of 31 practices that are in all 
circumstances considered to be unfair, i.e. without application of the above general 
clauses on misleading and aggressive practices.4
 The UCPD requires member states to ensure that there are adequate and effective 
means to combat the use of practices that are unfair in one of the above ways, including 
means by which persons or organisations regarded under national law as having 
a legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practices may take legal or 
administrative action against such practices.5
2.2 Preventive Control
The UCPD was implemented by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations (CPUTR) 2008.6 These introduce an injunctive or ‘cease and desist’ form of 
preventive control known as an ‘enforcement order’. They provide that where a practice 
is unfair (following the definitions in the UCPD itself), it amounts to a ‘Community 
infringement’ under the Enterprise Act (EA) 2002, thereby allowing enforcement 
authorities to ask a court to issue an ‘enforcement order’ against the continued use of 
the practice.
 Enforcement orders can be obtained (in the High Court or county court in England, 
Wales or Northern Ireland or the Court of Session or Sheriff Court in Scotland) against 
a trader carrying out the practice or likely to carry out the practice.7 Under EA, s. 213, 
enforcement orders can be sought by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), local trading 
standards authorities and the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in 
Northern Ireland (all deemed ‘general enforcers’). They can also be sought by those 
2 Arts. 5-9.
3 See Micklitz, in G. Howells, H. Micklitz, & T. Wilhelmsson (eds.), European Fair Trading Law (2006), 
at 121.
4 UCPD, Ann. 1.
5 UCPD Art. 11
6 2008/SI/1277. For the full background to implementation of the Directive see <www.berr.gov.uk/
consultations/page39674.html>. See also C. Twigg-Flesner and D. Parry, ‘The Challenges Posed by the 
Implementation of the Directive into Domestic Law – a UK Perspective’, in S. Weatherill and U. Bernitz 
(eds.), The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29 (2007); G. Howells, 
‘The End of an Era – Implementing the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in the United Kingdom: 
Punctual Criminal Law Gives Way to a General Criminal/Civil Law Standard’, 11 Journal of Business 
Law 183 (2009); H. Collins, ‘Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial 
Practices’, 73 Modern Law Review 89 (2010); C. Willett, ‘Unfairness under the Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations’, in J. Devenney, L. Fox O’Mahony, and M. Kenny (eds.), Unconscionability 
in European Private Financial Transactions (2010) 350; J. Williams and C. Hare, ‘Early Experiences 
of the Enforcement of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in Scotland’, 33 Journal of Consumer 
Policy 377 (2010); P. Cartwright, ‘Under Pressure: Regulating Aggressive Practices in the UK’, 2011 
Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 123; and C. Willett and M. Morgan-Taylor, ‘Consumer 
Protection’, in J. Chuah and M. Furmston (eds.), Commercial and Consumer Law (forthcoming 2012) 7.8.
7 EA, s. 212 and 217 and CPUTR, Reg. 26; and Willett and Morgan-Taylor, above n. 6.
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designated as enforcers by the Secretary of State (thus far the Civil Aviation Authority, 
the Information Commissioner, the Rail Regulator, the Gas and Electricity Markets 
Authority and the Director Generals of Telecommunications, Water, Gas and Electricity 
for Northern Ireland).8 Enforcement orders can also be sought by those ‘Community 
enforcers’ listed in the Official Journal under Art. 4.3 of the Injunctions Directive9 
(bodies from other Member States). (This is intended to facilitate cross-border co-
operation in enforcement.) Finally, they can be sought by Consumer Protection Co-
operation Enforcers, such as the Civil Aviation Authority, the Financial Services 
Authority, Ofcom, ICSTIS and the general enforcers mentioned above.10
 Enforcement is coordinated by the OFT. The enforcer must consult the trader and the 
OFT to seek to ensure cessation of the practice.11 Normally, this consultation period is 14 
days, but 7 days is sufficient for an interim order, and if the OFT considers it necessary, 
consultation can be dispensed with altogether. An enforcer may accept an ‘undertaking’ 
that the practice will cease (and, therefore, not proceed to seek an enforcement order).12
 The OFT issued guidance on the new concepts of unfairness when the law was first 
passed.13 Of course, it must be emphasised that this guidance represents the OFT view 
as to how the concepts of unfairness should be understood – it being open to the courts 
(when cases come before them) to take a different view.
 This ‘enforcement order’ regime for UCPD-based unfair practices fits within 
a broader regime of preventive control in UK consumer protection. Enforcement 
orders can also be obtained against other ‘Community infringements’, that is, actions 
that represent breaches of standards contained in various other EU directives.14 This 
would cover, for example, failure to abide by the various information obligations and 
cancellation rights that are provided for in directives on package travel, consumer 
credit, doorstep selling and distance selling.15 It also covers selling goods that do not 
meet the conformity standards in the Consumer Sales Directive (or failing to provide 
the remedies in the Consumer Sales Directive);16 the use of terms that are unfair under 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive;17 and breaches of the provisions of the Timeshare, 
Electronic Commerce and Television Broadcasting Directives.18
 Enforcement orders can also be obtained against so-called ‘domestic infringements’. 
Essentially, ‘domestic infringement’ covers a variety of actions that represent breaches 
of contract, statutory duties, criminal offences and torts that harm ‘the collective 
interests of consumers’.19 The label ‘domestic’ infringement is used to indicate that the 
actions in question represent breaches of standards that have been set by domestic law; 
that is, they have not come from EU law. So it would cover, for example, practices that 
amount to the criminal offence of harassment of debtors under the Administration of 
Justice Act (AJA), Section 40; and breaking contracts by not delivering promised goods 
or services.20 So quite apart from harassment representing a criminal offence and failure 
to deliver goods or services giving consumers the right to seek private law remedies for 
breach of contract, an enforcement order can be issued requiring such conduct to cease 
in future.
8 SI 2003/1399.
9 98/27/EC.
10 EA, s. 215(5A), added by the Enterprise Act 2002 (Amendment) Regs. 2006 (SI2006/3363) in order to 
implement the EC Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation (Reg. (EC) No. 2006/2004, as amended 
by the UCPD).
11 EA, s. 214.
12 EA, s. 219 (4).
13 OFT/BERR (2008) Guidance on the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading regulations, London, 
OFT/BERR, at <www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/cpregs/oft1008.pdf>.
14 EA, s. 212, Sch. 13.
15 Directives 90/314/EEC, 85/977/EEC, 87/102/EEC (as amended by 98/7/EC) and 97/7/EC respectively.
16 99/44/EC.
17 93/13/EEC.
18 Directives 94/47/EC, 2000/31/EC and 89/552/EEC (as amended by 97/36/EC) respectively.
19 EA, s. 211, 213(1)-(2) and 217(6); and Willett and Morgan-Taylor, above n. 6.
20 See EA, s. 211(a)-(b) and see the Enterprise Act 2002 (Domestic Infringements) Order 2003, SI 1593; 
and note that the Protection from Harassment Act is also solely of domestic origin, as is the general common 
law rule that failure to deliver goods or services promised under a contract represents a breach of contract.
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2.3 Europeanisation of Preventive Enforcement through the ‘General 
Clause’
So we can see that tools for preventive control of unfairness as defined by the UCPD have 
been ‘slotted in’ to a pre-existing national regime of preventive consumer protection. 
However, it is our contention that this is more than a mere technical extension of such 
preventive consumer protection powers. The pre-existing ‘domestic’ and ‘Community’ 
infringements all tend to involve relatively narrow and specific issues (often only in 
particular sectors): for example, failure to provide specific types of information in 
doorstep and distance sales; supply of defective goods; use of unfair contract terms; 
harassment of debtors etc.
 In contrast, the UCPD concepts of unfairness, which can now form the basis of 
preventive action, are much broader in their scope. The various ‘general clauses’ – 
‘misleading actions’, ‘misleading omissions’, ‘aggressive practices’, violation of 
‘professional diligence’ – are ‘general’ partly because they are themselves very open 
textured.21 In addition, they can be called ‘general’ because they cover such vast ground. 
They cover practices22 ‘before, during or after’ any ‘commercial transaction’;23 (there 
being no restriction to particular types of transaction or sector). So in relation to almost all 
conceivable goods or services, there is a ‘cradle to grave’ regime covering practices such 
as advertising, persuasion and negotiation at the pre-contractual stage; post-contractual 
alterations or variations; performance, delivery etc by the trader; performance, payment 
etc by the consumer; complaint handling; after sales service; and enforcement by either 
party.
 In short, UCPD implementation has brought a very significant expansion of the 
use of the ‘general clause’, a very significant ‘Europeanisation’ of the UK preventive 
consumer protection regime.24 (It is worth emphasising that use of an open-textured 
general clause that covers considerable ground is not only ‘European’ in the sense that 
it comes from a European Union directive, but also ‘European’ – and here, ‘continental’ 
European is the more precise term – in that this tradition of open-textured, broadly 
applicable general clauses is a tradition that is deeply embedded in the civil law legal 
tradition of continental Europe – and not the common law UK tradition.)25
2.4 Criminal Sanctions: Tradition, Rationales, Policies and Operation
Criminal sanctions have been a core part of public enforcement of consumer law in the 
UK for centuries. There is plenty of scope for debate as to the rationales for using the 
criminal law in the consumer protection sphere.26 Certainly, criminal sanctions can be 
viewed as having important deterrent effects that might be missing in the case of the 
21 See, on this, C. Willett, ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the 
UK’, 71 Cambridge Law Journal 412 (2012); and Willett, above n. 1.
22 Any ‘Act, Omission, Course of Conduct or Representation’ (UCPD Art. 2 (d)/CPUTR, Reg. 2 (1)).
23 UCPD, Art. 3 (1)/ CPUTR, Reg. 2 (1).
24 On Europeanisation see C. Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract Law (2008); C. Twigg-
Flesner (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (2010); R. Brownsword, H.-
 W. Micklitz, L. Niglia, & S. Weatherill, The Foundations of European Private Law (2011); and Willett, 
above n. 21. Of course, ‘Europeanisation’ more generally covers more than the use of concepts such as 
general clauses that derive from continental, civil law traditions than the common law tradition. It also 
covers, e.g., the way in these and other concepts are interpreted in an ‘autonomous’ European manner by the 
European Court of Justice; the ‘spillover’ or ‘spontaneous’ Europeanisation that may take place in areas not 
directly covered by a Directive (e.g. in private law, on which see below); and, indeed, the impact of barrier 
to trade rules on national contract and trade law (see C. Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanisation of Contract 
Law).
25 Generally see G. Howells, ‘General Clauses in European Consumer Law’, in Micklitz (ed.), 
Verbraucherrecht in Deutschland (2005); and S. Grundman and D. Mazeaud, General Clauses and 
Standards in European Contract Law (2005).
26 For an excellent and exhaustive review of rationales, see P. Cartwright, Consumer Protection and the 
Criminal Law (2001).
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preventive sanctions discussed above. More generally, the OFT has said that criminal 
enforcement should be used where
civil enforcement is unlikely to be effective in achieving a change in 
behavior and/or the breach is sufficiently serious that the conviction and 
punishment of offenders ought to be pursued, for example to protect the 
public and to provide wider deterrence.27
The OFT elaborates on this by saying that it is likely to consider beginning a criminal 
investigation:
 - where traders deliberately or recklessly use deceptive, misleading or 
fraudulent practices;
 - where traders deliberately or recklessly use aggressive, intimidating or 
coercive practices;
 - where flagrant and/or persistent offending by a trader or group of associated 
traders has occurred or is occurring;
 - where a particular unlawful practice is widespread, or there is a risk 
determined that criminal enforcement is likely to be the most effective 
means by which to set a precedent for future action; or
 - where false statements are made or false documents provided in the course 
of dealings with the OFT or another enforcement body or where the 
investigation is otherwise obstructed.28
Criminal sanctions have been, and continue to be, used, for instance, in relation to food 
labelling, quality and safety;29 and general product safety.30 They were used against 
‘false trade descriptions’ (Trade Descriptions Act-TDA-1968) (covering basically 
misleading statements about goods and services) and ‘misleading pricing’ (Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 Part III) until the implementation of the UCPD. These provisions 
were repealed by the CPUTR31 and replaced by offences based on the UCPD concepts. 
So a trader now commits an offence if he carries out a misleading act or omission or an 
aggressive practice (the definitions reflecting those in the UCPD).32 These are all strict 
liability offences, there being no mens rea requirement (i.e. no need to prove that the 
trader acted intentionally, recklessly or negligently). A trader also commits an offence 
if he contravenes the requirement of professional diligence.33 However, for the trader to 
be criminally liable for violation of the professional diligence standard, there is a mens 
rea requirement. The trader is guilty of an offence only if he ‘knowingly or recklessly 
[engages] in conduct’ that is contrary to professional diligence and materially distorts, 
or is likely to materially distort, consumer behaviour’.34 It is important to stress here 
that the trader need only be ‘knowing or reckless’ as to his own behaviour. There is no 
need for him to know of (or be reckless as to) its actual or likely effects on consumers.
 Finally, a trader also commits an offence if he engages in any practice set out in 
paras. 1-10, 12-27 and 29-31 of the Schedule of practices that are always regarded as 
unfair.35
 In the case of the misleading action and omission offences, the aggressive practice 
offence and the practices in Sch. 1, there are defences available.36 The defences are 
those that have long been used for ‘consumer protection’ offences in the UK so that 
earlier case law under the TDA and other legislation may still prove helpful.
27 OFT, Criminal Enforcement of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (2010), para 
2.1, available at <www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/policy/OFT1273.pdf>.
28 Id, at 2.2
29 B. Atwood, K. Thompson, & C. Willett, Food Law (2009).
30 Howells, above n. 6.
31 CPUTR, Schedule 4.
32 Regs. 9–11; and see Regs. 13 and 14 on penalties and time limits respectively.
33 Reg. 8.
34 Reg. 8(1) (a).
35 Reg. 12.
36 The defences are not available in the case of the ‘violation of professional diligence’ offence: if the 
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 One set of defences are those available under s. 17. Here the defendant must first 
prove that the commission of the offence is due to
 - a mistake that must be a mistake by the person charged, rather than one of 
their employees;37 or
 - reliance on information supplied to him by another person (whom the 
defendant must identify to the prosecution),38 for example, information as 
to mileage from previous owners of a vehicle39 or information on a product 
label placed there by the producer (and relied on by the retailer);40 or
 - the act or default of another person (whom the defendant must identify 
to the prosecution)41 who can be a party such as a sub-contractor or other 
party that is responsible for the activity in question, but can even be an 
employee,42 for example, as in Tesco v. Nattrass,43 where a supermarket 
manager who wrongly labelled washing powder counted as ‘another 
person’ for the purposes of the supermarket’s defence; or
 - an accident or another cause beyond his control, which may cover computer 
errors.44
Having established one of the above criteria, the defendant must then establish that he 
took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission 
of the offence by himself or any person under his control. Whether there have been 
‘reasonable precautions’ is a question of fact, which will be affected by the circumstances 
of each particular case. Different precautions may be necessary according to whether the 
defendant is a manufacturer, a retailer or a supplier of services, and what is required may 
well also vary according to whether the defendant is a large enterprise or a small corner 
shop.45 In general, the key is that an appropriate system must be in place to prevent 
the practice taking place, for example, devising an adequate training programme for 
employees;46 testing products (e.g. to see if they comply with information on labels);47 
or (in the case of false mileage readings on cars) checking the history, for example, 
through the registration document and obtaining statements from previous owners.48
 Whether there has been ‘due diligence’ turns on whether the system of reasonable 
precautions has actually been used in practice. If it has not, then there will be no due 
diligence and the defence will fail.49
 A further defence is provided by Reg. 18. There is a defence if the defendant can 
establish that it is his business to publish (or arrange for publication of) advertisements; he 
trader has been ‘knowing or reckless’ (the required mens rea for this offence), then it is hard to see how 
he can have exercised ‘reasonable precautions/due diligence’ (s. 17 defence) or ‘innocently’ published an 
advertisement (s. 18 defence), so it would be illogical for the defences to be available. 
37 Birkenhead Co-operative Society v. Roberts [1970] 1 WLR 1497.
38 Reg. 17(2).
39 See Simmons v. Potter, [1975] RTR 347 (although the due diligence element was not established in this 
case – see below); and Ealing LBC v. Taylor, [1995] CLR 156 (where due diligence was established – see 
below).
40 Hurley v. Martinez, [1991] CCLR 1.
41 Reg. 17(2).
42 So long as they are not so senior as to be an ‘alter ego’ of the company (e.g. members of the Board of 
Directors, managing director and other senior officers) (see Tesco v. Nattrass, [1971] 2 All ER 127).
43 Id.
44 See Berkshire CC v. Olympic Holidays Ltd, [1994] 13 Trading LR 251.
45 See Garrett v. Boots the Chemist, [1980].
46 See Tesco v. Nattrass, above n. 42.
47 Amos v. Melcom (Frozen Foods), [1985] 149 JP 712, DC (insufficient evidence of sampling to check if 
meat labelled ‘rump steak’ was actually thus).
48 See Richmond upon Thames LBC v. Motor Sales (Hounslow) Ltd, [1971] RTR 116; Wandsworth LBC 
v. Bentley, [1980] RTR 429 DC; and Ealing LBC v. Taylor, [1995] Crim LR 156. Even with some such 
checks, it has also been held that not enough had been done and that a statement disclaiming knowledge 
as to whether the mileage was correct was required as a ‘reasonable precaution’ against customers being 
misled (Simmons v. Potter [1975], RTR 347).
49 See Turtington v. United Co-operative Ltd, [1993] Crim LR 376; and see the judgment of Lord Diplock 
in the Tesco v. Nattrass case, above n. 42 for guidance on due diligence.
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received the advertisement for publication in the ordinary course of business, and he did 
not know, and had no reason to suspect, that its publication would amount to an offence. 
This covers those (such as newspapers and magazines) who publish advertisements, as 
well as those (such as advertising agencies) who arrange for publication.
 These defences are available partly because the offences are strict liability, and it is 
thought that some form of escape route from strict criminal liability should be available 
where blame is minimal. The ‘reasonable precautions and due diligence’ requirement 
can also be viewed as a way of incentivising traders to manage their affairs so as to 
avoid the behaviour in question. We would suggest that this is why, as we saw above, it 
is key to successful use of this defence to establish that an effective system was in place 
to prevent the practice taking place and that this system was operating properly in the 
circumstances in question.
2.5 Europeanisation of Criminal Enforcement Through the ‘General 
Clause’
So we can see that the UK has chosen to back up preventive control of (UCPD defined) 
unfair practices with traditional UK criminal sanctions. However, again, although the 
UK may be using traditional, ‘home-grown’ enforcement tools to enforce the European 
standards of fairness, we would suggest that these standards of fairness are, themselves, 
Europeanising the home-grown enforcement tools. The point, again, is the general 
clause and the very broad application of fairness that it has introduced to UK criminal 
law.
 To take one example, the pre-existing criminal rules tended not to cover statements 
made during the performance or enforcement of a contract. The TDA, for instance, 
was focused on statements about the goods or services themselves, tending to mean 
that the focus was on statements made at or around when the contract is first made.50 
However, statements made in the context of performance or enforcement are covered 
by the new (Europeanised) regime. We noted above that the UCPD concept applies 
to practices ‘before, during or after’ any ‘commercial transaction’.51 So the reach of 
criminal consumer protection law has been significantly extended by this European 
general clause. It will cover, for example, statements as to the rights of consumers, 
which might influence their decisions as to whether ‘to exercise a contractual right’52 
(possibly covering statements that deceive consumers as to their rights and that are 
therefore likely to cause them to make the decision not to enforce these rights).
3 Spontaneous Europeanisation of Private Law
The consumer contract laws of England and Scotland have certainly been significantly 
Europeanised over the past two or three decades.53 Most notably, we can speak of:
 - the European information and cancellation rights from the distance selling 
and package travel directives.54
50 See TDA, ss 1-5 and 14; and Willett and Morgan-Taylor, above n. 6, at 7.8.3.1.
51 UCPD, Art. 3 (1)/CPUTR, Reg. 2 (1).
52 For a misleading practice under the CPUTR/UCPD, the information must be false or be likely to 
deceive the average consumer and it must causes or be likely to cause the average consumer to take a 
transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise (UCPD, Art. 6 (1)/CPUTR, Reg. 5 (2) (a)-(b)); 
and ‘transactional decision’ includes a decision as to whether to exercise a contractual right (UCPD, Art. 2 
(k)/CPUTR, Reg. 2 (1)).
53 See Twigg-Flesner (2008), above n. 24.
54 Above n. 15; implemented in the UK by the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regs. 2000, SI 
2000/2334; and Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regs. 1992, SI 1992/3288. See now 
the expansion of European information obligations contained in the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/
EU).
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 - the European concept of fairness that applies to most standard terms;55
 - the European conformity standard applicable to sale and supply of consumer 
goods and the European ‘cure’ remedies of repair and replacement from 
the Consumer Sales Directive.56
The UCPD’s general clauses on practices do not apply in private law as such. As is well 
known, UCPD Article 3 (2) provides that the directive is ‘without prejudice to contract 
law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’. In 
other words, there is no direct obligation on member states to provide consumers with 
private law remedies where contracts are negotiated, concluded, performed or enforced 
in ways that are unfair within the meaning of the general clauses on misleading actions 
or omissions, aggressive practices, or professional diligence.
 Of course, there are pre-existing private law remedies in the UK for practices 
such as misrepresentation (rescission and damages), and duress and undue influence 
(rescission). (It should be emphasised here that action to rescind the contract must be 
taken by the party – here the consumer – affected by the practice, i.e. the contract is 
voidable, not void.) These concepts obviously cover a fair amount of the same ground 
as is covered by the misleading and aggressive practice concepts from the UCPD. At 
the same time, they are not necessarily always as protective as the UCPD concepts.57 
Nevertheless, when the Directive was first implemented, the UK chose not to extend the 
availability of private law remedies to cover cases of unfairness as defined by the UCPD 
general clauses.58
 However, it was always likely that private law would be Europeanised in less 
direct ways by the UCPD concepts of fairness. Such ‘spontaneous’ or ‘spillover’ 
Europeanisation might occur in the following ways.59 First of all, even if compliance with 
the standards set by the general clauses cannot be enforced through private law action as 
such, these standards inevitably affect contracting practice. As we have noted above, the 
UCPD general clauses apply ‘before, during or after’ any ‘commercial transaction’.60 So 
the European standards of fairness set by these general clauses determine how traders 
must behave towards consumers while seeking to persuade them to enter contracts, 
negotiating contracts and during the performance and enforcement of contracts.
 Second, there is always the possibility that the courts may develop pre-existing 
domestic concepts (e.g. misrepresentation, duress, undue influence) incrementally in 
ways that reflect the UCPD general clauses.
 Finally, the Law Commissions have been working on proposals for the introduction 
of some statutory private law remedies for at least certain violations of the UCPD general 
clauses.61 In brief, the idea is that there would be rescission and price reduction remedies 
on a ‘strict liability’ basis, while traders would be able to avoid damages liability by 
establishing that they had exercised ‘due diligence’ in seeking to avoid carrying out the 
practice in question. The remedies would not be available for misleading omissions or 
violation of professional diligence. This does mark a serious restriction on the degree of 
Europeanisation, given that these are two key ‘European’ concepts that have not played 
a significant role in UK private law.
55 Above n. 17; implemented in the UK by Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regs. 1999,SI 1999/2083; 
and see C. Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (2007).
56 Above n. 16, implemented by Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regs. 2002, SI 2002/3045.
57 See generally Willett, above n. 1; and Willett, above n. 21.
58 The idea was that the Law Commissions should investigate more fully the way in which the UCPD 
concepts could interact with the traditional UK concepts. See now Law Commission, A Private Right of 
Redress for Commercial Practices (2008); Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices, 
LCCP 199, April 2011; and Law Commissions, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices, 
Law Com 332, Scot Law Com 226, 2012. See further below on this work.
59 Generally on such forms of harmonisation, see W. Van Gerven, ERPL (2001) 492 and M.B.M. Loos, 
ERPL (2007) 515. For an excellent early analysis of the issue see S. Whittaker, ‘The Relationship of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to European and National Contract Laws’, in S. Weatherill and 
U. Bernitz, The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices (2007). Also, see Willett, above n. 1; and 
Willett,  above n. 21.
60 UCPD, Art. 3 (1)/CPUTR, Reg. 2 (1).
61 See above n. 58.
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 Nevertheless, the new remedies would be available for misleading actions and 
aggressive practices. The misleading action concept is perhaps not sufficiently 
different from domestic misrepresentation for us to say that the introduction of private 
law remedies in relation to it involves a significant Europeanisation.62 However, the 
aggressive practice concept has the potential to be understood in a significantly different 
and more protective way than the domestic duress and undue influence concepts.63 
So, introducing private law remedies for breach of the aggressive practice concept 
may significantly Europeanise this branch of consumer private law. Further, this is a 
potentially important area in practice, as it is where consumers must look for private law 
remedies against high-pressure selling and debt collection by traders.
4 Full Harmonisation, Minimum Harmonisation and Limits to 
Europeanisation: Financial Services
4.1 Full Harmonisation
We have already seen that the CPUTR repealed key generally applicable rules on 
trade descriptions and misleading pricing. It also repealed a very large number of rules 
dealing with more specific types of practice.64 One reason for all of these repeals was to 
foster simplicity, i.e. to avoid having complicated overlap and duplication as between 
the main piece of legislation (the CPUTR) and large numbers of pre-existing rules. 
However, another key reason for repealing as much as possible of the old law was the 
full harmonisation clause in Article 4, which provides that:
Member States shall neither restrict the freedom to provide services nor 
restrict the free movement of goods for reasons falling within the field 
approximated by this Directive.
The final section (below) will suggest that the UCPD concepts often offer the potential to 
provide greater protection than was provided by pre-existing law. Nevertheless, the more 
pre-existing law remaining on the statute book, the greater the risk that some of it might, 
in some or other way, exceed the level of protection offered by the UCPD concepts. 
So in order to avoid this risk of offending against the full harmonisation principle in 
Article 4, vast swathes of pre-existing law were repealed; this further reinforcing the 
Europeanisation process that has been the key narrative of this article so far.
4.2 Minimum Harmonisation and the Limits of Europeanisation: the case 
of Financial Services
Notwithstanding the significant Europeanising effect of the UCPD as explained above, 
‘home grown’ UK rules may continue to play the main regulatory role in the areas of 
financial services and immovable property, which are exempted by Article 3 (9) from 
the full harmonisation principle that applies generally under the UCPD. In these sectors, 
there is, in effect, the minimum harmonisation that has generally applied in the past to 
consumer protection directives.
 We will focus here on financial services as it is such an important element of the 
consumer economy. The ‘home grown’ regime here operates within a well-established 
institutional structure and (as is permitted by Article 3(9)) may well set higher standards 
of protection than those in the UCPD.65
62 Although the price reduction remedy would be a useful one that does not exist currently for common 
law misrepresentation.
63 See Willett, above n. 1; Willett, above n. 21; and see further below at notes 82-87 and related text.
64 CPUTR, Schedule 4.
65 For similar conclusions in relation to immovable property, see Civic Consulting, Study on the 
Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices in the EU (2012).
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 We will concentrate on the regime regulating secured credit.66 Currently, secured 
credit (covering the first legal charge over a borrower’s home) and other financial 
services are regulated by the FSA under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 
2000.67 This is done under the rules in the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Handbook 
(specific and detailed rules dealing with specific practices),68 the general principles 
for business,69 the Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) Outcomes70 and the CPUTR (the 
regime implementing the UCPD).71
 Certainly, it is difficult to make definitive comparisons between the very open-
textured general principles for business, the TCF Outcomes and the similarly open-
textured (but differently worded) definitions of ‘unfair’ practices from the UCPD. 
Comparison is further complicated by the huge volume of more specific rules (contained 
in the FSA Handbook), which support and complement the more general FSA principles 
of fairness.72 The problem here is to say whether (as well as reflecting the broad FSA 
principles) these Handbook rules can be said to represent a natural ‘unpacking’ of the 
broader UCPD standards of fairness or whether they go beyond this and provide greater 
protection.
 Nevertheless, we would suggest that the FSA principles may often set higher 
standards than the UCPD. First of all, let us consider the rules on misleading actions. 
Violation of the UCPD ‘misleading action’ provision must involve information as to 
one of the matters on the list contained in Article 6(1)(a)-(g). This could be considered 
to be an exhaustive list, and although it is very broad in scope, it does not necessarily 
cover every potential type of information. However, a practice might certainly be 
considered to be misleading, and therefore unfair, under the FSA regime despite not 
involving information on the list in Article 6 (1). FSA general principle 7 refers to the 
obligation to ‘communicate information to [consumers] in a way which is clear, fair and 
not misleading’, and this applies whatever the subject matter of the information.
 Also, under the UCPD, it is not sufficient to establish that the practice would mislead 
the average consumer. It must, in addition, be shown that the impact of the practice is 
or is likely to be such that the average consumer would take a ‘transactional decision’ 
different from that which they would take otherwise.73 This requirement can make a 
difference to whether a practice is unfair or not. For instance, a price or other charge that 
is understated by a few pence arguably still misleads the average consumer, but may be 
66 For similar conclusions in relation to unsecured credit, see Civic Consulting, above n. 65.
67 The FSA is responsible for both protecting consumers and maintaining confidence in the financial 
markets (FMSA, ss. 2, 3 and 5); and see the rule-making powers in FMSA, s. 138, as amended by Financial 
Services Act 2010, ss. 3 (4) and 26 (1) (c). No firms are allowed to operate (provide regulated financial 
services) in the first place until the FSA has given them permission to do so. NB that plans are currently 
being discussed for a transfer of the consumer protection function of the FSA next year to a new ‘Financial 
Conduct Authority’: see Financial Services Bill 2010-12 to 2012-13 available at http://services.parliament.
uk/bills/2010-12/financialservices.html and M. Wheatley, ‘Journey to the FCA’, FSA/PN/092/2012, 
available at <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/092.shtml>.
68 Available at <www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/handbook/index.shtml>.
69 Full Handbook, Principle 2.1, available at <https://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/PRIN/2/1>.
70 FSA, Treating Customers Fairly, available at <www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/Regulated/tcf/index.
shtml>; and see J. Black, M. Hopper, & C. Band, Making a Success of Principles Based Regulation (2007), 
Law and Financial Markets Review 191; T. Williams, ‘Open the Box: An Exploration of the Financial 
Service Authority’s Model of Fairness in Consumer Financial Transactions’, in J. Devenney, L. Fox 
O’Mahony, and M. Kenny (eds.), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions (2010) 
227; and P. Cartwright, ‘Conceptualising and Understanding Fairness: Lessons from and for Financial 
Services’, in J. Devenney, L. Fox O’Mahony, & M. Kenny (eds.), Unconscionability in European Private 
Financial Transactions (2010) 205.
71 On the approach of the FSA to the UCPD/CPUTR generally see <www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/
International/ucp/index.shtml>.
 Note also that the OFT is the main enforcer under the CPUTR, but there is an agreement between the 
OFT and the FSA on division of responsibilities for financial services matters-see Concordat between the 
OFT and FSA, November 2009, at <https://webmail.dmu.ac.uk/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.
fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/concordat_fsa_oft_08.pdf>.
72 The Handbook subdivides into separate ‘sub’ books containing hundreds of rules on such issues as 
mortgages and home finance, insurance, banking, client assets, building societies, collective investment, 
credit unions, and dispute resolution.
73 UCPD, Art. 6 (1).
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unlikely to cause him or her to contract for a service or product that they would not have 
bought in any case. If not, the understated price or charge will not be misleading under 
the UCPD. However, it would arguably be misleading under the FSA regime, which 
contains no ‘transactional decision’ requirement.
 Turning to ‘misleading omissions’, first of all, the UCPD test turns on whether the 
information is ‘material’ and is ‘needed’ by the ‘average consumer’. The TCF Principles 
simply say that consumers should be provided with ‘clear information and … kept 
appropriately informed’. Secondly, as with misleading actions, there is only a misleading 
omission under the UCPD, where the omission is likely to cause the average consumer 
to take a ‘transactional decision’ different from that which they would take otherwise.74 
As indicated above, there is no such requirement in the FSA general principles. Third, 
the FSA wrote to the payment protection insurance industry to remind them of typically 
unacceptable practices at the point of sale that had come to the FSA’s attention. One of 
these was that:
The firm did not take reasonable steps to ensure the customer only bought 
a policy for which he was eligible to claim benefits.75
There is at least room for debate as to whether information as to eligibility would 
necessarily be ‘needed’ or ‘material’ under the UCPD test.
 Now turning to aggressive practices, there are a number of requirements that are 
specific to the UCPD ‘aggressive practices’ clause that do not need to be established 
for there to be unfairness under the FSA regime. These requirements may mean that 
the FSA regime provides a higher level of protection than the UCPD regime. So under 
the UCPD, one route to establishing an aggressive practice is to show that there is 
‘coercion or harassment’ leading to an actual or likely ‘significant restriction’ on the 
average consumer’s ‘freedom of choice or conduct’.76 Otherwise, it must be shown 
that there is ‘undue influence’, for which there must be ‘exploitation’ of a ‘position of 
power’ through ‘pressure’, which ‘significantly’ impairs (or is likely to so impair) the 
average consumer’s ‘freedom of choice or conduct’, specifically, here, by ‘significantly’ 
limiting the ability of this average consumer to take an ‘informed decision’.77 None of 
these criteria are mentioned in discussing fairness/unfairness in general under the FSA 
regime. So it is plausible that practices (pressure selling, aggressive enforcement etc.) 
might fail to meet these particular UCPD criteria but still be sufficient to amount to 
unfairness under the more open-textured FSA regime.
 Then, as with misleading practices, there is the requirement of ‘transactional decision 
making’, which applies to all UCPD concepts. In the case of any practice claimed to be 
aggressive under the UCPD provisions, it must be shown that the result of the coercion, 
harassment or undue influence would be (or be likely to be) that consumers would take a 
transactional decision different to the one they would have taken otherwise.78 As we have 
seen, the concepts of fairness under the FSA regime do not contain such a requirement. 
So there could be aggressive behaviour that is of a more one sided, unilateral nature, 
where the business simply imposes a detrimental outcome on a consumer or withdraws 
a service from a consumer. This has the potential to be viewed as unfair under the 
general FSA concepts of fairness, but it would be more difficult to show that it affects 
consumer transactional decision making as such (as required under the UCPD).79
 What is clear from the above discussion is that regulation of secured credit operates 
within a well-established domestic institutional structure and may well set higher 
standards of protection than those in the UCPD. For these reasons, along with the 
74 Art. 7 (1).
75 FSA, Consultation Paper 10/6, The assessment and redress of Payment Protection Insurance complaints 
Feedback on CP09/23 and further consultation, App. 3, Point 6.
76 Art. 8.
77 Arts 8 and 2 (j).
78 UCPD Art. 5.
79 See discussion in Willett, above n. 1 on possible ways around this problem.
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minimum harmonisation allowed by Article 3(9), this home grown regime is likely to 
remain the dominant force in financial services regulation,80 with the European UCPD 
norms being unlikely to play a major role.
5 Judicial Approaches to Europeanisation
5.1 The Potential to Increase Standards of Protection Relative to Pre-
existing UK law
In contrast to the position just described in relation to financial services, the UCPD 
generally has the potential to increase standards of protection relative to pre-existing 
UK law. This is something that has been demonstrated at length elsewhere;81 and there is 
no space here to provide a systematic comparison between the UCPD and pre-existing 
UK standards. However, it is worthwhile providing some key examples.
 To begin with, there is the UCPD ‘misleading omissions’ concept.82 It is well known 
that there has never been such a general rule against omissions in UK domestic law, 
so there is clearly now potential for a higher level of protection. Next, one might 
cite the ‘undue influence’ limb of the aggressive practices general clause.83 This, as 
outlined above, covers exploitation of a ‘position of power’ through ‘pressure’, which 
‘significantly impairs’ (or is likely to so impair) the average consumer’s ‘freedom of 
choice or conduct’, specifically by significantly limiting the ability of this average 
consumer to take an ‘informed decision’.84 Pre-existing UK domestic criminal and 
preventive rules focused mainly on the specific problem of harassment of debtors.85 
The UCPD undue influence concept seems to have the potential to cover much more 
than this. For example, greater trader knowledge/skill might be considered to create a 
‘power relationship’ and the potential for ‘pressure’ at the sales stage. In this context, 
some high-pressure selling might well amount to undue influence, where, for instance, 
consumers are put on the spot to make quick decisions (the decision may, then, not 
be ‘informed’, as there was insufficient time to think it through). Post contractually, 
the power relationship and pressure might come, for instance, from vulnerability when 
struggling with commitments. This might enable traders to pressure consumers into new 
commitments, refinancing etc. Clearly, these examples go well beyond what is covered 
by rules on harassment of debtors. They also extend beyond the traditional scope of 
domestic private law undue influence. Inter alia, this requires a special relationship of 
trust and confidence (rather than just a ‘relationship of power’), and has, in practice in 
modern times, been restricted to the ‘bank guarantee’ scenario.86
 In summary, then, the point is that (outside the financial services sphere) the UCPD’s 
European concepts of fairness contain the potential to increase levels of consumer 
protection in the UK. In this sense, the ‘Europeanising’ effect of the UCPD could be 
said to be all the more significant. Not only does the UCPD Europeanise the preventive, 
criminal and private law tools (as shown in the first part of this article), but it also 
Europeanises the substantive level of protection provided.
80 The FSA regime appears to be very much the first ‘port of call’ for the FSA, the UCPD regime being 
viewed as a relatively residual ‘back up’.
81 See Willett, above n. 1; and Willett, above n. 6.
82 UCPD, Art. 7/CPUTR, Regs. 6.
83 Generally, see Willett, above n. 1; Willett, above n. 6; and Cartwright, above n. 6.
84 And thereby causes him to take or be likely to take a transactional decision he would not take otherwise: 
UCPD, Arts. 8 and 2 (j)/CPUTR, Regs. 7(1) and (3)(b).
85 Administration of Justice Act 1970, s. 40.
86 RBOS v. Etridge (No. 2), [2002] 2 AC 773 for a summary of the cases and a re-statement of the rules.
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5.2 Some Illustrative Cases87
So far, the evidence suggests that judges have taken a relatively protective approach to 
interpretation of the UCPD concepts.
 For example, from a consumer protection perspective, one perennial risk with 
concepts of ‘fairness’ or ‘good faith’ is that they will be understood to require subjective 
dishonesty by the trader. Now we have noted above that, in the case of the ‘professional 
diligence’ concept, there is only criminal liability under the UK regime where there 
is indeed mens rea in the form of intention or recklessness by the trader.88 There is 
no mention of trader intention or recklessness where preventive control measures 
(enforcement orders) are concerned. At the same time, professional diligence is defined 
for all purposes, by reference, inter alia, to ‘honest market practice’.89 Nevertheless, the 
High Court has resisted any temptation to read this in a non-protective way. It was made 
clear in Tiscali UK Ltd v. British Telecommunications Plc that there was an ‘objective’ 
test of dishonesty, in that it was not necessary to demonstrate that at the time of the 
offending statement, its maker knew it to be false or had no honest belief in its truth.90
 Another encouraging decision from a consumer protection perspective is OFT v. 
Purely Creative.91 This case dealt with whether various ‘scratchcard’ promotions 
violated the general clauses on misleading actions and omissions. On the facts, it 
was held that some did and some did not. However, the key point for our purposes 
is that the High Court understood the ‘average consumer’ concept by reference to a 
relatively protective ethic, recognising that such a consumer will not necessarily read 
all information provided.92
 This case is obviously significant in the context of the misleading action and omission 
concepts. It suggests that courts should focus on the main information provided (or not 
provided, where omissions are concerned) in deciding whether the average consumer is 
likely to be misled and caused to take a transactional decision that would not otherwise 
be taken. This core information (or lack of it) is what should determine whether there has 
been a misleading action or omission rather than information provided in supplementary 
form, small print etc.
 Such an approach could also suggest a protective approach to the ‘undue influence’ 
limb of the aggressive practices concept. As indicated above, the undue influence 
concept turns on whether consumers have been prevented by ‘pressure’ from making an 
‘informed decision.’ If this was understood in a non-protective way, the interpretation 
might be that if trader pressure is followed by a formal transparent explanation of risks, 
the average consumer is now able to take an ‘informed decision’, and there is, therefore, 
87 Aside from the cases discussed here, for examples of cases decided under the CPUTR, see also McGuffick 
v. Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, [2009] EWHC 2386; Kingspan Group Plc v. Rockwool Ltd, [2011] EWHC 
250 (Ch); and OFT v. Peter Hall (available at <www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/38-10>).
88 See note 32 and related text.
89 Art. 2 (h)/CPUTR, Reg. 2 (1).
90 [2008] EWHC 3129 (QB).
91 [2011] EWHC 106 (Ch). The defendants have appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal, whose 
decision has been stayed pending a reference to the ECJ to determine the scope of Para. 31 of Ann. 1 to the 
Directive (i.e. the list of practices that are always to be considered unfair, without the need to apply one 
of the general tests of unfairness). The questions referred explore whether Para. 31 prohibits traders from 
telling consumers that they have won a prize if any of the methods of claiming it involve any charge (even 
a de minimis one) being incurred by the consumer; what is actually meant by de minimis; and whether a 
‘false impression’ of winning a prize depends, inter alia, on the relative value of the prize when compared 
with the cost of claiming it ([2011] EWCA Civ 920). See below n. 95-96 and related text on the ECJ 
decision. For a discussion see M. Morgan-Taylor, ‘Preventing Distribution of Promotions to Consumers 
Involving Unfair Practices – OFT application for Order under Enterprise Act 2002: OFT v. Purely Creative 
Ltd et al’, 16 Communications Law 115 (2011).
92 Id., para. 66. This ‘average consumer’ concept (who is deemed to be ‘reasonably well informed and 
reasonably circumspect’ is, of course, the core benchmark for assessing practices under the regime (UCPD, 
Arts. 5-9, Preamble, recital 18/CPUTR, Reg. 2 (2)). Of course, this standard can be varied to the average 
member of targeted or vulnerable groups of consumers (UCPD, Arts. 5(2)(b) and 5 (3)/CPUTR, Regs. 2 
(4) and 2 (5)). There is no space here to discuss these alternative benchmarks. However, see discussion 
in Willett, above n. 6; and see, for example, the OFT work on mental capacity: OFT, Mental Capacity 
consultation (OFT 1293con), available at <www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/127-10>.
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no undue influence. However, if we follow the logic of the approach in the Purely 
Creative case, this would be an unlikely conclusion. Purely Creative, as we have seen, 
takes the line that consumers will not necessarily read all information provided. It seems 
to follow from this that standardised explanations of risks are even less likely to be read 
where the average consumer has been affected by pressure from the trader. In short, 
the Purely Creative decision suggests that, where there is significant trader pressure, 
this should raise a very strong presumption that the average consumer is likely to be 
prevented from making an ‘informed decision’ (a presumption that it should be very 
difficult to overturn by reference to evidence about standardised explanations as to the 
risks).
 The most recent case was Ashbourne Management Services Limited.93 The plaintiff in 
this case was the OFT, while the defendant was a company that specialised in recruiting 
gym members for fitness clubs across the country. The case concerned, inter alia, threats 
to report consumers to credit reference agencies for non-payment of sums allegedly due 
under the agreements with the gyms. For our purposes the important point is that the 
High Court decided that such threats amounted to aggressive practices where the sums 
in question were legitimately in dispute and where the sums were no more than claims 
for unliquidated damages. This seems to approach the aggressive practices concept in a 
relatively protective manner. It takes account of the very significant detrimental impact 
on consumers of being reported to a credit reference agency and therefore having a 
poor credit record that will affect future attempts to borrow money. Importantly, also, 
it seems to recognise that traders should not simply be viewed as having a legitimate 
interest in taking any otherwise legal action to protect their interests. They should be 
expected to take seriously any genuine dispute as to the validity of their claim.
6 Concluding Comments
This article has demonstrated that the UK has implemented the UCPD via a mixture of 
preventive and criminal enforcement techniques, but that these techniques have been 
‘Europeanised’ by the open-textured nature and significant breadth of application of the 
UCPD concepts. It has also shown that the UCPD may also lead to a more spontaneous 
(less direct) Europeanisation of UK private law, in particular by moving towards 
introducing remedies for certain violations of the UCPD concepts of fairness.
 At the same time, we have demonstrated an important limit to the Europeanisation 
brought about by the UCPD. In the hugely important financial services sector, Article 3 
(9) of the UCPD, inter alia, is likely to mean that the pre-existing domestic regime will 
not be significantly Europeanised by the UCPD concepts.
 In the latter part of the article, we focused on the role of judges when it comes to the 
reception of the UCPD in the UK. It was argued that the UCPD’s European concepts of 
fairness often have the potential to increase consumer protection in the UK, and that, so 
far, UK judges have been relatively protective in the way in which they have interpreted 
these UCPD concepts.
 Of course, as we have noted many times throughout this article, the UCPD unfairness 
concepts are of a rather ‘open-textured’ nature. This means that, while they can (and 
have so far) been interpreted in relatively protective ways, they might also be interpreted 
in ways that are rather more grounded in values of trader self-interest and consumer 
self-reliance. For instance, for the purposes of the misleading action concept, it might 
be taken that consumers can be expected to read not only the ‘headline’ information, 
but also less prominent information that in some way qualifies or negates a misleading 
impression that has been given by the headline information. Further, to revisit the 
example of undue influence above, if this was understood in a non-protective way, it 
might be said that if trader pressure is followed by a formal transparent explanation of 
risks, the average consumer is now able to take an ‘informed decision’, and there is no 
undue influence.
93 Office of Fair Trading v. Ashbourne Management Services Limited, John Clayton-Wright and Dawne 
Clayton-Wright, [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch).
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 The point is that so far there have only been High Court decisions. We have yet to 
hear the views of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court94 on such matters. So we 
cannot be sure as yet as to what ethic of fairness will ultimately take hold in the UK. The 
Court of Appeal in the Purely Creative case made a reference to the ECJ.95 Of course, 
this reference goes to questions as to the interpretation of paragraph 31 of Annex 1 to the 
Directive and not to interpretation of the general tests of unfairness (i.e. the clauses on 
misleading and aggressive practices and on professional diligence). The guidance will 
therefore be of limited general assistance. Nevertheless, it may still tell us something 
as to the attitude of the ECJ to the level of protection intended. The ECJ decided that 
when para. 31 refers to a ‘false impression’ in relation to winning a prize (when in fact 
this is subject to some action or cost for the consumer), this, inter alia, includes cases 
where any one of the optional ways in which to claim the prize requires the consumer 
to incur any cost whatsoever. The Court explained that para. 31 aims to address the 
aggressive practice of exploiting the psychological effect of being told a prize has been 
won, this being likely to induce consumers to take the irrational choice of choosing the 
more expensive (but quicker) route (e.g. a premium rate call) to discover the nature of 
the prize.96 This suggests that the ECJ is sensitive to the potential for consumer freedom 
of choice to be readily compromised when ‘put on the spot’ by attractive offers that tend 
to induce speedy and economically detrimental decisions. We must now wait to see 
whether the UK (and other national courts) are inclined to make references under the 
aggressive practices (or the other) general clauses and whether the ECJ chooses to take 
to carry over this relatively protective approach from para. 31 to its interpretations of the 
general clauses. 
94 See Willett, above n. 21, where one of the present authors argues that (i) the Supreme Court has chosen 
to unpack and apply the similarly open-textured general clause on unfair contract terms (and associated 
provisions) (from Directive 93/13/EEC) by reference to an ethic of trader self-interest and consumer self-
reliance, rather than by reference to an ethic of protection; and (ii) that this is in contrast to the more 
protective approaches taken by the OFT and the Court of Appeal. This may be one reason why the Court of 
Appeal chose to make a reference to the ECJ in the Purely Creative case (above, n. 91). But see n. 96 below 
on the limits of this reference.
95 See above, n. 91.
96 C-428/11.
